We develop the hypothesis that culturally evolved accounting principles will be ultimately explained by their consilience with how the human brain has evolved biologically to evaluate social and economic exchange. We provide background on the structure and evolution of the brain, the measurement of brain behavior during economic decision making, and the brain's central role in building economic institutions. We describe the emergence of modern accounting principles and argue that the primary function of accounting in evaluating exchange is to provide quantified information on the net benefits of past exchanges. We review evidence documented by neuroscientists that is consistent with the hypothesis that longstanding accounting principles ͑e.g., Revenue Realization and Conservatism͒ have distinct parallels in brain behaviors. Our analysis of Neuroaccounting extends Basu and Waymire ͑2006͒ to provide a new way to scientifically view accounting, which has implications for how we think about the origins and persistence of longstanding accounting principles.
INTRODUCTION
W e propose that neuroscience can provide a foundational understanding of accounting principles that have been shaped over a long history. We hypothesize that specific accounting principles have emerged and persisted because they are consilient with how the brain has evolved biologically to evaluate exchange opportunities.
1 This hypothesis has its roots in research on the primate brain in biology, anthropology, psychology, and economics. Although no accounting literature presently links accounting principles with neuroscience, interesting parallels exist between culturally evolved accounting and the human brain's behavior when making economic decisions. Accordingly, our objectives in this paper are to ͑1͒ provide a theoretical analysis of how accounting principles could emerge and persist in a manner consistent with how the human brain orders economic exchange, and ͑2͒ review the neuroeconomics evidence consistent with a relation between accounting principles and human decision making in exchange.
2
Many accounting principles are hundreds of years old. Conservatism dates to the early 15th century, nearly 90 years before publication of Pacioli's text on double-entry bookkeeping ͑Little-ton 1941͒. Likewise, the principles of Objectivity, Revenue Recognition, and asset valuation at Historical Cost likely arose from the efforts by auditors and the courts to piece together the transaction history of firms that subsequently filed for bankruptcy or liquidation after paying allegedly excessive dividends ͑Littleton 1937; Gilman 1939, 158-159 and 292-294; May 1946, 88-91; Chatfield 1974, 231-269͒. At the same time, spontaneously evolved accounting principles have been criticized, both in terms of specific principles, as well as for the broader use of induction to infer principles from practices whose origins are divorced from any deductive framework. For example, critics of historical cost have often asserted the superiority of asset values based on estimates derived from current market prices ͑MacNeal 1939; Chambers 1966; Sterling 1970͒ . Earlier principles were also asserted to be ad hoc and have no basis in an explicit framework for setting accounting policies. FASB cited this argument in their attempts to define their conceptual framework ͑Storey and Storey 1998, 86-88͒. The bigger issue in this debate, which rarely has been explicitly stated, is one of rationally designed versus ecologically rational economic institutions ͑Smith Sargent 2008͒ . Proponents of rational-design theories of institutions often successfully advocate for institutional change, but the unintended consequences of such changes can be material. At the same time, at least in accounting, proponents of evolution toward ecologically rational institutions have not fully specified the forces that drive institutional change and, more fundamentally, the ultimate basis for the institutions that have spontaneously evolved. 3 This paper is a first step in establishing a scientific basis for accounting principles rooted in the behavior of the biologically evolved human brain. In support of this perspective, we review several studies from neuroscience that provide preliminary support for our hypothesis. We believe that our perspective on accounting principles can fundamentally change how accounting scholars view efforts to design accounting using conceptual frameworks. At a minimum, we hope that our analysis will lead readers to recognize that designed deductive frameworks are themselves ad hoc constructions divorced from any science-based theory of human behavior.
The paper is organized as follows. We begin by providing a brief overview of the hypothesis advanced in this paper. We then briefly summarize some basic knowledge about human brain
BRAIN STRUCTURE AND THE MEASUREMENT OF BRAIN ACTIVITY
All living organisms have brains or brain-like functions-for example, the E. coli bacterium is capable of processing environmental information and adjusting behavior in response to that information ͑Allman 2000, 3-8͒. Homo sapiens and other primates descended from ancient vertebrates, which in turn descended from lower life forms. The brain thus evolved via selection in the same manner as other features of human anatomy and physiology. Variation is produced by genetic mutations that are inheritable and have fitness consequences ͑i.e., differential survival and reproductive capabilities͒ for a particular organism. Selection does not work from a "blank slate," but builds on structures that already exist ͑Pinker 2002͒. In constructing the human brain, natural selection has added features to the brains of species that have come before us.
From an anatomical perspective, this means that those components of the brain lying just beneath the skull ͑i.e., the neocortex͒ evolved later, while components further below the surface evolved from earlier life forms. Four lobes distinguish the neocortex: the frontal, occipital, temporal, and parietal. Each has been linked with specialized functions, although the degree of connectivity and coordination within the brain is considerable, which means claims of specialized function are debatable. Interior parts of the brain ͑e.g., the hypothalamus, striatum, cerebellum, ventral tegmental͒ have longer evolutionary histories than the neocortex.
Within the brain, several hundred billion specialized cells known as neurons do the brain's work. Cajal ͑1960͒ first identified neuronal signaling as the fundamental unit of activity of the nervous system. The human brain enables communication between and coordination of this massive set of neurons. In this sense, the brain is an extraordinarily decentralized communication system. The main body of the neuron ͑the soma͒ has extensions in the form of dendrites that respond to chemical messages ͑in the form of neurotransmitters͒ from other cells ͑see Panel A of Figure 1͒ . These chemical messages promote the accumulation of negative chemical charge within the cell body, which leads to the critical "firing" of the neuron. 4 The typical communication between two neurons is depicted in Panel B of Figure 1 . Communication between neurons occurs when an influx of sodium ions at the axon hillock leads to transmission of electrical charges down the axon. When the charge reaches the end of the axon, packets of the neuron's own neurotransmitter are then released through its boutons into the synaptic opening ͑the synaptic cleft͒.
Neuroeconomics research aims to isolate how neurons interact to generate observable economic behavior. Researchers focus on identifying which neurons are firing and how their firing rate changes as a laboratory subject is exposed to repetitions of a stimulus or to different conditions. Neuroscientists use two primary methods to gather neuronal activation data: ͑1͒ functional magnetic resonance imaging ͑fMRI͒ imaging, and ͑2͒ single-cell recording.
fMRI ͑and similar scanning technologies such as positron emission tomography or PET͒ is the method of choice to study human economic behavior because the technique is noninvasive. 5 Numerous pictures from brain scans taken while the subject is under observation indicate where neuronal firing has likely occurred. Single-cell recording is an invasive technique that is typically used only with nonhumans such as Macaque monkeys. Single-cell recording requires placing 4 Hodgkin et al. ͑1952͒ first isolated the process of neuronal firing. Working with squid that have relatively large neurons, they implanted pipettes inside specific neurons and were able to measure the relative electric charge inside and outside the neurons. When the differential voltage between the inside and outside of the neuron reaches about 60 millivolts, sodium ion channels along the membrane of the axon open, allowing a large influx of positively charged sodium ions. 5 fMRI infers neuronal firing indirectly by measuring the capillary flow of oxygenated blood being supplied to recently fired neurons ͑Roy and Sherrington 1890͒. When such blood flow is detected it is inferred that a specific part of the brain has recently experienced neuronal firing.
electrodes capable of detecting neuronal firing at specific sites in the brain. Studies on nonhuman primates often parallel studies on humans with fMRI, and provide a view of the human brain and human behavior in a more primitive evolutionary state than modern Homo sapiens ͑e.g., De Waal 2005͒.
THE BRAIN AND BEHAVIORAL NORMS IN EXCHANGE Evolutionary Psychology and Norms Supporting Extended Exchange
Primates have exceptionally large brains relative to their body size ͑Jerison 1973͒. One hypothesis is that the larger human brain is an adaptation to better exploit our social instincts for mutual gain. The social brain hypothesis suggests that humans are particularly well suited to group interaction. Species with larger ratios of neocortex to body size sustain larger social groups ͑Dunbar 1992, 1998; Dunbar and Shultz 2007͒. One behavioral implication of the social brain FIGURE 1 Schematic Representation of the Neuron hypothesis is that humans have an evolved ability to engage in social exchange-that is, to trade favors through reciprocation. 6 Evolutionary psychologists posit that the human brain represents an evolved set of computational modules that sustain and extend human social exchange ͑Cosmides and Tooby 1987; Cosmides 1992 Cosmides , 2005 Cosmides , 1989 Tooby and Cosmides 1992͒ . These modules include means for cheater detection such as facial recognition, the ability to recognize intentionality in others ͑i.e., theory of mind͒, and memory of past interactions.
7 Figure 2 provides a schematic overview of the factors that we believe enter into bilateral exchange evaluation. This figure helps to organize what follows, but it is not universally applicable-that is, not all factors may be pertinent to a given exchange observed in the field and/or in the laboratory. Cheater detection is the primary emphasis in a simple setting without economic institutions. Each individual ex ante assesses the likelihood of net rewards that will result from an exchange. In these settings, a benefit can be conferred but may not be reciprocated by the other party. Individuals must assess this risk and search the set of identified exchange opportunities for their best exchange prospect.
Evaluation of a potential exchange partner is based on ͑1͒ trustworthiness inferred from pre-exchange interactions, ͑2͒ cooperation in past exchanges with that person, ͑3͒ the history of 6 Reciprocity has been asserted as a human universal ͑Brown 1991; Wilson 2000͒, and ethnographers studying primitive societies have documented elaborate economies built around ceremonial gift exchange ͑e.g., Malinowski 1922; Mauss 1950 Mauss /1990 Sahlins 1972͒. 7 Behavior consistent with the predictions of evolutionary psychology has been verified in experiments using individuals from hunter-gatherer economies that more closely resemble ancient human groups ͑Sugiyama et al. 2002͒ . Experimental economists have also investigated the hypotheses of evolutionary psychology ͑Hoffman et al. 1998͒.
the potential partner's cooperation in exchange with others, and ͑4͒ comparison of the potential partner to similar individuals. Information is evaluated conditional on the social setting where exchange will be consummated as reflected in shared norms of cooperative behavior and available mechanisms for punishing cheaters. The evaluation of the desirability of exchange with a potential partner uses several of the brain's abilities that have evolved to enable pre-exchange cheater detection in human social environments. Using this ex ante evaluation, the desirability of consummating an exchange is assessed and the terms of exchange are negotiated. In the case of a "no" decision, other partners are sought or the search is abandoned. Consummating the exchange leads to ex post evaluation of how consistent the actual net rewards are with the ex ante evaluation and, if necessary, whether to initiate punishment mechanisms. In this sense, expectations about a partner's anticipated behavior are aligned with actual behavior through repeated interaction that involves the same partner, or even others to the extent that what is presently learned about one partner can be generalized across time or to other possible partners.
Evolutionary psychology suggests that the means by which economic actors process this information depends critically on how the brain has evolved to facilitate such evaluation. This evaluation may resemble a "rational" process wherein benefits and sacrifices are implicitly evaluated, but a decision maker may not necessarily recognize when these underlying causal mechanisms are operating within the brain. Furthermore, the decision maker has no conscious awareness that the processes implicated in exchange evaluation have deep evolutionary roots in our species and that of other primates.
The Emergence of Behavioral Norms in Social Exchange
Economic institutions are built incrementally from behavioral patterns ͑i.e., norms͒ that emerge gradually as the brain constructs order in the world through experience ͑North 2005, 23-64͒. Three norms of human behavior in exchange are building blocks for institutions: ͑1͒ fairness norms, ͑2͒ trust-based reputations, and ͑3͒ altruistic punishment. These norms promote reciprocity by guiding action and provide incentives for individuals to communicate their trustworthiness to others. Behavioral norms are central features of human culture that reflect evolved psychological mechanisms that enable exchange ͑Tooby and Cosmides 1992, 116-122͒.
Brief descriptions of fairness norms, trust-based reputations, and altruistic punishment are provided in Panel A of Table 1 along with pertinent citations of the research we describe. Panel B of Table 1 provides a list of the brain areas identified in these studies, all of which involve humans who are scanned while making economic decisions.
Social Norms for Fairness
Accounting takes place within societies relying on social norms such as fairness. Fairness norms are manifested in various forms such as equitable allocation and prices, and fair adjudication by third parties ͑e.g., legal processes͒. One experimental method used to study fairness is the two-person, one-shot ultimatum game, which is depicted in Figure 3 . In this game, Player 1 ͑the proposer͒ is endowed with an economic pie of, say, ten dollars. The proposer has the choice to share part of this endowment with another person ͑Player 2-the responder͒. The proposer first offers a split of the pie in dollars ranging from zero to the entire endowment of ten dollars. The responder then chooses to either accept or reject the split offered. If the responder accepts the proposed split, the experimenter implements the proposal. If the responder rejects the split offered, then both players receive nothing.
The prediction in this setting is that a purely self-interested responder will accept the proposed split as long as the amount is positive. Given this, the proposer is expected to offer the responder the minimum amount of one dollar and retain the rest. Experiments using this game find that subjects playing the role of responders will typically reject offers of three dollars or less and will counter offer a 50/50 split ͑Güth et al. 1982; Hoffman et al. 1998͒ . These experiments further indicate that responders will often be angry when proposers make low offers ͑Pillutla and Murnighan 1996͒.
Sanfey et al. ͑2003͒ investigate the neural basis for negative emotions experienced by players receiving low offers in the ultimatum game. They used 19 subjects playing the responder role and scanned their brain activation areas in response to 30 separate offers. Ten different human subjects playing the role of proposer made ten offers, a computer generated ten offers, and those who saw only the offers were rewarded merely for pressing a button in ten cases where no offers were actually executed. All scanned individuals saw the same set of offers in each of the 30 rounds of play. The authors hypothesized that "unfair offers would engage neural structures involved in both emotional and cognitive processing, and that the magnitude of activation in these structures might explain variance in the subsequent decision to accept or reject these offers" ͑Sanfey et al. 2003, 1756͒. 
Trust-Based Reputations
Reciprocal economic exchange is promoted when parties to an exchange interact repeatedly and can develop reputations for honesty, which enables trust by their exchange partners. An experiment frequently used to examine trust is the two-person trust game ͑Berg et al. 1995͒. This basic experiment can be extended to a multi-period setting to directly examine how trust-based reputations are formed ͑Camerer and Weigelt 1988; King-Casas et al. 2005; Basu, Dickhaut, Hecht, Towry, and Waymire 2009͒ . The sequence of play in the trust game is shown in Figure 4 . In the first stage, Player 1 ͑the investor͒ is endowed with ten dollars and then decides whether to invest part of the endowment with another person ͑Player 2-the trustee͒. The investor chooses an investment ranging from zero dollars up to the full endowment of ten dollars. Any amount invested generates gains from trade because it is tripled en route to the trustee. The investor retains 8 Earlier drafts had included a select group of fMRI pictures from the pertinent studies. These high quality color pictures are excluded here since black-and-white reproduction obscures details. We have developed a supplement to aid the reader that is available on SSRN ͑Dickhaut, Basu, McCabe, and Waymire, 2009͒ . Prior drafts that included these pictures can also be found at SSRN.com.
any amount not sent to the trustee. After receiving the tripled amount, the trustee then decides on an amount to send back to the investor. The investor faces a dilemma: whether to trust the trustee to send back an amount that yields the investor a net positive return. Obviously, lacking trust will lead the investor to retain his entire endowment and not subject it to the risk of trustee nonreciprocation. The intuitive economic prediction in a one-shot trust game is that a self-interested trustee will retain all that is received from the investor. The investor will anticipate this action and send nothing to the trustee-that is, a lack of trust results in potential gains from trade not being realized. However, if the investor and trustee can play the game for multiple periods, it becomes possible for the trustee to establish a reputation for sending back amounts to the investor. In a multi-period game, the investor will come to trust the trustee as the trustee develops a reputation for reciprocity as the history of exchange develops between the investor and trustee. Multi-period play extends the trust relation in the other direction as well; investment levels signal the trustee that reciprocating can yield benefits in the form of higher future investments.
King-Casas et al. ͑2005͒ implement a multi-period trust game to examine the neural correlates of trust-based reputation in social exchange. Each of 48 investor-trustee pairs plays a ten-period trust game where both the investors' and trustees' brains are scanned simultaneously during the experiment. This offers a unique opportunity to directly measure the "meeting of the minds" between two parties where trust-based reputation in exchange is of first-order importance.
The analysis in King-Casas et al. ͑2005͒ is based on comparisons of trustee brain area activations between cases of benevolent, neutral, and malevolent reciprocity. In benevolent ͑malevo-lent͒ reciprocity, a player departs from a perfect tit-for-tat strategy by being generous ͑breaching trust͒ in the player's next action given the partner's most recent decision. Neutral reciprocity occurs when the player's action is consistent with a perfect tit-for-tat strategy. Comparing neutral reciprocity to the other cases indicates that "surprise" actions departing from perfect tit-for-tat are associated with activations in multiple trustee brain regions. A comparison of benevolent and malevolent reciprocity indicates differential activation in the trustee's caudate nucleus. These findings suggest that departures from expected behavior induce brain responses, and these responses are asymmetric for positive and negative departures.
King-Casas et al. ͑2005͒ hypothesize specifically that the activations noted above would correlate positively with the trustee's next decision to repay, and that these signals affecting the trustee's brain would be correlated with activations in the investor's brain ͑King-Casas et al. 2005, 80͒. Stated differently, a trustee's decision reflecting an "intention to trust" ͑i.e., an increased repayment amount͒ would follow an act of benevolent reciprocity by the investor and vice versa. In consequence, the investor's brain should anticipate the consequences of the investor's current action on the trustee's brain in the form of an intention to trust that leads to positive cross-brain correlations in neural activity.
The scan of the average investor's brain is compared with the average trustee's. The area of the investor's brain activated when investment is made ͑the middle cingulate cortex͒ is positively correlated with increased activity in the area of the trustee's brain when the investor's decision is revealed ͑the anterior cingulate cortex͒. These activations occur shortly after the investor made the decision and revealed it to the trustee respectively. The timing of the investor's middle cingulate cortex activation and the trustee's anterior cingulate cortex activation did not differ between early and late periods in the game. Activations between the trustee's caudate nucleus are also positively associated with activation in the investor's middle cingulate cortex and the trustee's anterior cingulate cortex.
The most important result in King-Casas et al. ͑2005͒ is a shift to earlier caudate activation in the trustee's brain observed in later periods of the experiment. Specifically, caudate nucleus activation reflecting an intention to trust was approximately 14 seconds earlier for later rounds of play relative to early rounds. This finding suggests that the formation of reputation by one player is reflected in important changes in neural activity of their trading partner's brain that anticipates a partner's action to a greater degree.
The King-Casas et al. ͑2005͒ findings indicate that the brain enables trust-based reputations between parties to a series of exchanges. This observation is consistent with the notion that a history of beneficial exchange can encourage repeat future interactions ͑Axelrod and Hamilton 1981͒. Evidence also shows that a reputation for cooperation acquired through observation of past interactions extends to other species such as cleaner fish ͑Bshary and Grutter 2006͒. The cumulative weight of this evidence suggests that trust-based reputations derived from the history of interaction are likely an important component of complex human cooperation ͑Nowak and Sigmund 2005͒.
Altruistic Punishment
Modern economies depend on sanctioning institutions that enforce an extensive system of property rights, contractual restrictions, and reporting obligations. These institutions encourage reciprocity and are intended to generate social benefits without directly benefiting those who administer the sanctions ͑altruistic punishment͒. Providing enforcement devices in experiments, Fehr and Gächter ͑2002͒ demonstrate that individuals will choose to engage in altruistic punishment and that such punishment encourages reciprocity.
de Quervain et al. ͑2004͒ explored the neural underpinnings of altruistic punishment using a modified trust game in which it was possible to punish a trustee who had cheated an investor ͑see Figure 5͒ . Investors and trustees were each endowed with 10 units of experimental currency ͑which was convertible to money payment͒. The investor faced a binary choice of sending either the entire endowment ͑10 units͒ or nothing. If 10 units were sent, this amount was quadrupled and the trustee thus had 50 units. The trustee then faced a binary choice of sending back half of his holdings ͑25 units͒ or nothing. Finally, the investor was given the option to inflict a punishment on the trustee. Punishment was experimentally manipulated by allowing the trustee to be punished under four different conditions. Under condition 1 the investor could punish the trustee at the rate of two monetary units for each monetary unit the investor was willing to sacrifice. In condition 2, the investor could impose the same punishment of two monetary units without bearing any personal cost. Under condition 3, punishment was symbolic; that is, it involved no reduction of resources by the trustee or investor. Under condition 4, punishment was applied randomly. The investors were subject to brain scans using positron emission topography ͑PET͒ during the punishment phase of the experimental trials.
The caudate nucleus was sensitive to instances in which punishment could be effective ͑con-ditions 1 and 2 versus conditions 3 and 4͒. The level of caudate activation in condition 2 ͑costless punishment͒ correlated with data ͑obtained via questionnaire͒ on investors' perceived level of the desirability of punishment. Thus, the brain distinguishes the quality of punishment mechanisms. Furthermore, investors' decisions to increase payments for punishment lead to higher levels of caudate nucleus activation, which is consistent with the proposition that such activation reflects the desirability of punishment. de Quervain et al. ͑2004͒ also use the difference in situations where punishment is costly ͑condition 1͒ versus costless ͑condition 2͒ to locate areas of the brain that mediated benefits and costs. This comparison will be explored in more depth in our subsequent discussion of accounting's Expense Matching & Cost Management principle.
In conclusion, the important point here is that the brain can evaluate altruistic punishment in conjunction with implementation of a broader strategy for exchange. This sets the stage for the emergence of punishment-based institutions such as courts and enforcement agencies whose reward is not directly linked to the execution of their function.
THE BRAIN, EXCHANGE, AND ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES What is an Accounting Principle?
When we use the term principle in this essay, we have in mind a definition akin to "a comprehensive and fundamental law, doctrine, or assumption" ͑Merriam-Webster's Dictionary͒. Principles exist within a multi-hierarchical decision setting and are intended to function as guides to behavior that are substantially broader than norms. Principles can be either designed or inferred from evolved practices; our primary focus concerns evolved accounting principles that result from human action but not necessarily human design ͑Ferguson 1767 Hayek 1967; Smith 2003͒. 9 9 Volcanic eruptions are neither the result of human action nor human design, while climate control inside the house is the result of both human action and human design. A third category of observable phenomena results from human action but not human design: a prominent example is a natural language such as English.
FIGURE 5 Depiction of the Modified Trust Game Used by de Quervain et al. (2004)
Accounting principles provide guidance as to the general properties of more effective measurement rules that emerged through trial-and-error processes over long periods, and are potentially discoverable through processes of induction ͑Littleton 1953͒. Accounting principles are like common law in that they are discovered through a sense-making process, and come to be applied in an expanding range of circumstances ͑Hayek 1973; 1976; 1979͒. Byrne ͑1937, 368-371͒ describes this process:
In the development of any field, principles are discovered which represent the fundamental truths on which the field of knowledge rests. These principles are applied in the working out of problems that arise, and gradually, rules of practice evolve which, over a period of time, become accepted to a greater or less degree as reflecting the oft-recurring cases.
͑I͒nherent in accounting principles are business laws which must be obeyed if in the long run the enterprise is to survive … It should be apparent, however, that the basing of financial policies upon accounting statements which in turn are not prepared with fundamentally right accounting principles, may lead to courses of action which, if too long pursued, will adversely affect the health of business. It is in this sense that the fundamental principles of accounting may be said to be coercive and self-executory. ͑emphasis in original͒
Accounting as an Emergent Institution to Facilitate Economic Exchange
Accounting provides quantified estimates of the values received and sacrificed through exchange using monetary units. Accounting records of past exchange provide a basis to identify and retain in memory more subtle forms of behavior by trading partners. Evaluations of a partner's trustworthiness based on transaction records can substantially improve coordination of partners' behavior in more complex reciprocal exchange ͑Basu, Dickhaut, Hecht, Towry, and Waymire 2009͒. Specifically, accounting may be useful for identifying subtle forms of cheating ͑Trivers 1971, 46͒:
Two forms of cheating can be distinguished, here denoted as gross and subtle. In gross cheating the cheater fails to reciprocate at all, and the altruist suffers the costs of whatever altruism he has dispensed without any compensating benefits … Subtle cheating, by contrast, involves reciprocating, but always attempting to give less than one was given, or more precisely, to give less than the partner would give if the situation were reversed … Because human altruism may span huge periods of time, a lifetime even, and because thousands of exchanges may take place, involving many different "goods" and with many different cost/benefit ratios, the problem of computing the relevant totals, detecting imbalances, and deciding whether they are due to chance or to small-scale cheating is an extremely difficult one. ͑emphasis in original͒ Two parties consummate transactions when each decides that the other party can be trusted to fulfill obligations under the exchange. This requires that the parties credibly and clearly communicate their intended behaviors to each other. Pinker ͑2003, 27͒ hypothesizes that human language facilitates communication about others' trustworthiness in exchange:
What is the machinery of language trying to accomplish? The system appears to have been put together to encode propositional information-who did what to whom, what is true of what, when, where and why-into a signal that can be conveyed from one person to another. It is not hard to see why it might have been adaptive for a species with the rest of our characteristics to evolve such an ability. The structures of grammar are well suited to conveying information about technology, such as which two things can be put together to produce a third thing; about the local environment, such as where things are; about the social environment, such as who did what to whom, when where and why; and about one's own intentions, such as If you do this, I will do that, which accurately conveys the promises and threats that undergird relations of exchange and dominance. ͑emphasis in original͒ Pinker's hypothesis suggests that the ability to communicate through the spoken word expands the scale and complexity of feasible exchange opportunities available to humans ͑see also Dunbar 1996͒. Humans can also distinguish quantities, which further promotes exchange since intended and actual actions can be represented more precisely in both speech and cultural artifacts ͑e.g., receipts, contracts, and accounts͒ that represent how we account for exchange transactions ͑Dehaene 1997͒.
The subsequent cultural emergence of written language and the ability to store information external to the brain expands available memory resources and likely alters the nature of social interaction in fundamental ways ͑Donald 1991, 312͒:
External memory is a critical feature of modern human cognition, if we are trying to build an evolutionary bridge from Neolithic to modern cognitive capabilities or a structural bridge from mythic to theoretic culture. The brain may not have changed recently in its genetic makeup, but its link to an accumulating external memory network affords it cognitive powers that would not have been possible in isolation. This is more than a metaphor; each time the brain carries out an operation in concert with the external symbolic storage system, it becomes part of a network. Its memory structure is temporarily altered; and the locus of cognitive control changes.
Consistent with Donald's ͑1991͒ broad hypothesis, accounting represents a cognitive artifactual system that determines the scale and complexity of human economic interaction ͑Hutchins 1999; Schmandt-Besserat 1999; Mouck 2004; Basu and Waymire 2006; Basu, Dickhaut, Hecht, Towry, and Waymire 2009; Basu, Kirk, and Waymire 2009͒ . Accounting, like other economic institutions, complements how the human brain orders its external environment to promote the discovery and consummation of new exchange opportunities ͑North 2005͒.
Accounting records encode data symbolizing that exchange has been consummated and the particulars of a given exchange ͑e.g., who transacted, what was exchanged, the nature of remaining obligations, etc.͒. A written record serves a similar purpose to the spoken word in that it allows humans to state and remember shared expectations ͑i.e., common knowledge͒ associated with a specific exchange when it is consummated. Preserving information on exchange via external accounting records is valuable because it extends the life of common knowledge; that is, shared understandings can be carried forward for a longer time.
Accounting and transaction records are likely useful in two ways in better ordering the brain's evaluation of exchange desirability. One is that accounting alleviates a capacity constraint on memory; that is, the brain has limited memory regarding the results of past exchange ͑Basu and Waymire 2006͒. Second, accounting can improve coordination among multiple modules within the brain that are implicated in exchange evaluation; for example, by balancing emotion and more rational cost-benefit evaluation based on quantified information. This latter function of accounting in ordering interaction has been recognized for more than five centuries. Pacioli ͑1494/1924, 1͒ states ͑quoted by Carruthers and Espeland 1991, 36͒: The present treatise will serve all their needs with regard to accounts and recording, and for this reason only do I insert it. I therefore intend to give sufficient rules to enable them to keep all their accounts and books in an orderly manner … The third and last thing necessary is that all one's affairs be arranged in good order so that one may get, without loss of time, all the particulars as to the debit and also the credit of all of them, as business does not deal with anything else. This is very useful, because it would be impossible to conduct business without due order of recording, for without rest, merchants would always be in great mental trouble.
The importance of accounting is likely a function of the extent to which an individual or a group of cooperating individuals face environmental uncertainty. In a decentralized economy characterized by uncertainty, a firm's local circumstances constitute the most relevant source of information ͑Hayek 1945͒. A system that measures rewards and sacrifices from exchange actually consummated is a useful guide to action in a world where transactions are endogenously "discovered" through skill, ingenuity, and effort ͑Coase 1937; Alchian 1950; Hayek 1968; North 2005͒ . Historical-cost accrual accounting that measures income based primarily on a firm's actual trans-actions is likely valuable for this reason ͑Littleton 1937, 16-22͒. That is, accounting provides information on the costs and benefits of actual exchanges, which aids in identifying behaviors that are more likely to lead to successful future exchanges within the firm's actual environment ͑Waymire 2009͒.
Accounting has a comparative advantage over less formal information sources because it is based on reliable and quantified information derived from past exchange. It is widely recognized that third-party information sharing ͑i.e., gossip͒ plays a role in establishing an individual's reputation for cooperative and trustworthy behavior, which sustains exchange within a dense social group of modest size ͑Barkow 1992; Dunbar 1996͒. The central problem with gossip shared verbally is inaccuracy that increases as interaction scales up to include extensive impersonal exchange on the market. The inaccuracy of verbally retransmitted information can result from memory failure, imperfect signal processing, or even deceit when one person seeks to destroy another's reputation for personal gain or spite. Inaccurately transmitted third-party information can cause cooperative arrangements to unravel ͑Ohtsuki et al. Rockenbach and Milinski 2009͒ . Because accounting provides "hard" information, it increases the extent to which that information can be shared reliably with third parties; for example, credit rating agencies can rely to a greater degree on reliable data arising from past transactions in evaluating an individual's or firm's creditworthiness.
In addition, the human brain carries a neuronal structure that approximates a real number line ͑Dehaene 1997͒. Ability to recognize different quantities is apparent in experiments that ask subjects to compare and manipulate numerical magnitudes. For example, two numbers can be shown on a screen, and the subject is asked to push a left button if the number on the left of the screen is larger than the number on the right of the screen. In Moyer and Landauer's ͑1967͒ experiment, ten subjects were presented with each pair from the Cartesian product of ͕1, 2,…,9͖ and were instructed to choose which number was larger as fast as possible without error. The number pairs remained on the screen until the choice was made. Results indicate that subjects made errors more frequently and had higher reaction times when the numbers were closer to each other. This is labeled as "the distance effect."
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The explanation for phenomena like the distance effect is that numeric symbols are transformed to associative cortex and semantic representations, which are made downstream and are inherently noisy. For example, chimpanzees trained to match a presented frequency of between one and five dots with a prior example of three dots will often correctly match three presented dots with a previous three-dot example. Presentations of two and four dots will be erroneously matched more frequently with the prior three-dot example than either one-dot or five-dot examples ͑Tudu-sciuc and Nieder 2007͒. A distance effect in humans results because we also work with a noisy representation, even of certain amounts. Thus, we map directly from noisy representation to motor actions with the result that such actions become stochastic responses to experimental stimuli.
11
This research is important because it suggests that any comparative advantage of human brains over other primate brains in immediate quantity recognition may be a second-order effect. Rather, our ability to comprehend slight distinctions between differing large quantities results from our ability to work with external symbolic representations such as written numbers and arithmetic 10 In a variation of Moyer and Landauer's experiment, Dehaene et al. ͑1990͒ presented subjects with a number drawn randomly from 1 to 100, and asked them whether the number presented was greater or less than 55. They were again instructed to choose without error as fast as possible. As with Moyer and Landauer ͑1967͒, the experiment revealed the distance effect in that numbers closer to 55 were judged incorrectly more often and were characterized by longer reaction times. 11 Similar effects are noted in tasks that require combinations of numerical operations ͑Zbrodoff and Logan 1990͒.
We use U.S. sources from before the first FASB concepts statements to specify a set of accounting principles, because our emphasis is on culturally evolved principles rather than principles that have been designed explicitly by policy makers. U.S. texts written after 1970 are likely strongly influenced by the FASB Conceptual Framework project. We used texts in both financial and managerial accounting for purposes of defining a set of principles around which to organize our review of the neuroscience evidence. These texts include Gilman ͑1939͒, Paton and Littleton ͑1940͒, Vatter ͑1950͒, and Littleton ͑1953͒. Panel B of Figure 6 lists 12 accounting principles we identified from these texts.
12
The principles of Duality, Revenue Realization, Expense Matching & Cost Management, Conservatism, Going Concern, Periodicity, and Consistency apply to cost-benefit evaluation. Transactions are consummated acts of reciprocity that entail receipt of a benefit accompanied by a sacrifice; these dual effects of transactions are symbolically represented through debits and credits in a journal entry ͑Duality͒. Revenue Realization and Expense Matching & Cost Management reflect the focus of accounting on increasing and identifying income resulting from a reciprocal exchange transaction. Simultaneous expense and revenue identification is also consistent with duality of exchange being fundamental to a firm's economic performance in a market economy.
Conservatism limits the overstatement of net assets and income and constrains decisions that could harm one's reputation in a multi-period world; for example, it is acceptable to write down one's receivables but not one's payables. Likewise, the assumption that the firm will operate for the foreseeable future encourages long-term thinking in evaluating the desirability of exchange ͑Going Concern͒. Finally, accountants partition time into periods for purposes of measuring an entity's performance ͑Periodicity͒, and apply accounting methods consistently through time for a given type of transaction ͑Consistency͒.
Any comparative advantage for accounting over other information sources likely occurs because accounting produces information based on reliable, quantified data. Objectivity, Historical Cost, Auditing & Internal Control, Unit of Measure, and Materiality are principles that deal with the reliability of quantified accounting information.
Accountants record only those transactions whose occurrence can be verified by objective evidence of a consummated arms-length transaction ͑Objectivity͒. Relying on objective evidence ensures that the records are "hard" in the sense that it will be "difficult for people to disagree" about past events and remaining obligations ͑Ijiri 1975, 36͒. Transactions are recorded on the basis of initial cost established in arms-length exchange ͑Historical Cost͒.
Auditing & Internal Control ensures that transactions are consummated by delegated persons within an organization; the resultant information is developed in accordance with established and consistently applied procedures, and the underlying transaction data and resultant accounts are subject to independent verification and attestation by third parties. Consummated transactions are symbolically represented in accounting records using a common monetary unit ͑Unit of Measure͒, which provides homogeneous data that facilitates combination of "price-aggregates" that form the basis for financial statement amounts ͑Paton and Littleton 1940͒. Because highly precise measurement is costly, measurement errors are tolerated unless they are so large as to likely alter actors' decisions ͑Materiality͒.
In the next two sections of the paper, we review the neuroscience evidence that suggests an association between accounting principles and the behavior of the brain during economic decision making. We first discuss the evidence on cost-benefit evaluation principles and then review the evidence relevant to reliability and quantification of accounting information. In each section, we focus initially on evidence that more strongly suggests an association between the brain and accounting, and then we discuss less direct evidence.
EVIDENCE ON THE BRAIN AND COST-BENEFIT EVALUATION
Our review of the neuroscientific evidence is organized along the lines of Panel B in Figure 6 . To aid the reader in better understanding this material, Panel A of Table 2 provides a list of the specific neuroscientific studies cited for the four accounting principles related to cost-benefit evaluation where the evidentiary basis is stronger for our hypothesis ͑Duality, Revenue Realization, Expense Matching & Cost Management, and Conservatism͒ along with a description of the brain areas implicated in these studies. After reviewing this evidence, we will briefly discuss other studies providing less direct evidence related to going concern, periodicity, and consistency.
Duality
Double-entry bookkeeping has long been argued to be the driving force behind the development of capitalism ͑Sombart 1919; Weber 1927 Weber /1981 Mises 1949 Mises /1998 Schumpeter 1950͒ . 13 The hypothesis is that double-entry accounting produces a mindset that leads naturally to the evaluation of profit, which is articulated in the calculus of economic choice ͑Carruthers and Espeland 1991; Most 1972͒. One likely factor contributing to the viability of double entry is its similarity to how the brain tracks the frequency of different phenomena when making a decision. For example, double-entry accounts are structured so that dual effects of transactions are represented in debits and credits reflecting increases and decreases in various accounts.
Consider a liability account where credits are accumulating faster than debits, which are reflected in a positive liability balance at a given point in time. Shadlen and Newsome ͑2001͒ isolated a similar counting device in the brain of the Macaque monkey using single-cell recording. The monkey observes a screen with dots moving right and left on the screen. Some dots, the ones moving right for example, exceed in number other dots that are moving to the left. The monkey is rewarded when he moves his eyes toward the direction in which more dots are moving. To perform such a task, the monkey records ͑in the form of neuronal activations͒ the net movement of all dots ͑left or right͒, and the difference between the two at any point in time is registered in the lateral intraparietal sulcus. This area plays a role in spatial attention ͑Coull and Nobre 1998͒ and processing symbolic numerical symbols ͑Cantlon et al. 2006͒ .
Both right and left movements are reflected in positive amounts ͑just like credits and debits͒, and the difference will be registered as a positive account balance of the net movements in a particular direction. When this difference reaches a critical level, a message is sent to the monkey's motor system, and the monkey's eye movement will indicate a choice. The monkey's brain uses these "accounts" as decision variables that trigger an action much like accounting balances can be used to assess whether loan provisions are satisfactory or whether recorded inventory cost is excessive in relation to realizable value. Thus, we are arguing for consilience between the parietal lobe's information-gathering capability and the way that accounting information is accumulated and triggers decision.
Revenue Realization
If person A receives a good from person B in exchange for cash, a signed receipt provides evidence that both sides of the transaction are complete. Accordingly, we would conclude that B has earned revenue for the amount paid by A. Suppose, however, that only one side of the transaction was performed; for example, A receives a good and signs an agreement to pay B a definite amount in the future. In this case, the guiding principle for recognizing revenue by B is based on the likelihood that B will receive the future cash payment from A. When the probability of collection is relatively low, sales revenue might not be recognized until cash is actually collected ͑e.g., the installment method͒. In contrast, when the probability of collection is high, revenue is typically recognized at the point of sale. Panels A and B in Figure 7 depict these contrasting circumstances. This difference in accounting for revenues parallels the time series of neuronal activation ͑based on single-cell recording͒ in the ventral tegmental cortex of a Macaque monkey during a task involving uncertain rewards ͑Fiorillo et al. 2003͒. Dopamine neurons in this area of the brain have been implicated in reward processing ͑Schultz et al. 1997͒. Less neuronal firing occurs when the monkey receives an anticipatory stimulus that a low probability reward may be forthcoming. Neuronal firing in this condition occurs later when the reward is actually received. When probability is high that a reward will be received, neuronal firing is observed primarily when the stimulus occurs with limited activation when the reward is actually received.
In this experiment, the stimulus signals that a reward may be forthcoming in much the same way that the sale and delivery of the good signal that a cash inflow may be forthcoming. Recognition in both instances depends on the likelihood of a reward for the monkey or a cash receipt for the business. In other words, Revenue Realization is consilient with how the ventral tegmental area of the primate brain behaves in evaluating uncertain rewards.
Expense Matching and Cost Management
The matching of effort with accomplishment in accounting dates back to basic bookkeeping as articulated by Pacioli Cost Management followed in part from the needs of a going concern to separate capital and income to avoid paying dividends that impair the firm's capital ͑Littleton 1934; Chatfield 1974, 77-86͒. Depreciation charges against income came about in part for this reason ͑Brief 1966͒. Cost management is obviously the central objective of management accounting implemented through the tools of cost discovery, budgeting, and variance analysis ͑Vatter 1950, 329-344͒. Microeconomic theory incorporates the notion of matching revenues and expenses relative to an action by the business; for example, a decision to manufacture goods for subsequent sale on the product market ͑Kohn 2004͒. In economics this concept has been systematically refined to consider small changes in revenue and related costs that arise from small increases in amounts produced and exchanged; that is, marginal cost and marginal revenue. Obviously, the economic and accounting concepts are not identical, but they are highly similar in that mutually advantageous exchange requires that each party sacrifice something of value to obtain goods or services deemed to be of equal or higher value. Thus, each party jointly compares what to receive and what to sacrifice in the exchange.
The comparison of costs with benefits is prevalent among nonhuman animals. Denk et al. ͑2005͒ show that laboratory rats engage in cost-benefit evaluation when faced with a choice between a low-cost/low-benefit alternative and a high-cost/high-benefit alternative. Other examples include the predatory snail, which, when hungry, can differentially suppress avoidance behavior ͑Gillette et al. 2000͒, and sheep, who control their total food intake to increase diet quality relative to a given cost ͑Thornley et al. 1994͒.
de Quervain et al. ͑2004͒ provide evidence that the human brain engages in cost-benefit evaluation that resembles matching of rewards and sacrifices. They use the difference between
FIGURE 7 Revenue Realization
Panels A and B depict differences in revenue recognition for an installment sale where the probability of collection is relatively low (Panel A) and the typical credit sale where the probability of collection is relatively high (Panel B). Note that frequency of recording is on the vertical axis in this picture. When the probability of collection is low, sales revenue is not recognized until cash is collected. When the probability of collection is high, revenue is recognized at the point of sale.
settings where punishment is costly ͑condition 1͒ versus costless ͑condition 2͒ to locate areas of the brain that mediate benefits and costs. The benefits from punishment are identical in these two conditions, but the costs of punishment are higher in condition 1 than in condition 2. For present purposes, the important result in de Quervain et al. ͑2004͒ is differential activation in the orbitofrontal and ventromedial cortex, which is consistent with the notion that the brain records costbenefit differences when making economic decisions. The orbitofrontal cortex is associated with the processing of negative emotions such as anger and disgust ͑Blair 2004͒, in particular as a response inhibitor to negative emotion ͑Camille et al. 2004͒. The ventromedial cortex is involved in regulating planning, social behavior, emotion, and feeling ͑Bechara et al. 2000͒ . This evidence suggests that the brains of humans make reward-sacrifice comparisons similar to accounting income measurement based on the Expense Matching & Cost Management principle.
Other aspects of brain behavior also parallel concepts from management accounting. For example, forming expectations with budgets and analysis of variances from budgets are critical aspects of cost management in managerial accounting ͑Vatter 1950, 112-119͒. The human brain also functions so as to form expectations and identify "surprise" events. For example, the brain is highly sensitive to whether the present stimulus is consistent with the most recent stimulus. The temporal difference model discussed in Berns et al. ͑2001͒ describes how the reward system of the brain is strongly activated when surprise occurs in the environment. In other words, the human brain naturally searches for instances in which observation differs from expectations.
Conservatism
Conservatism dates from at least 90 years before publication in 1494 of Pacioli's text on double-entry bookkeeping ͑e.g., Littleton 1941͒. Conservatism is most clearly evident in the lower-of-cost-or-market rule, which is characterized by the dictum to "recognize all losses, but anticipate no gains" ͑Gilman 1939, 130-131 and 232-236͒. Conservatism is often applied to inventories, but can be extended to virtually all noncash assets. For example, research and development has often through U.S. history been ͑and is currently being͒ written off at the time of expenditure ͑Waymire and Basu 2007, sec. 4.2͒. The fact that businesses chose conservative accounting before formal standard setting suggests that they elected to constrain their measurement of income ͑and assets͒ by suppressing value increases. Such a constraint would reduce retained earnings, which can signal restraint in paying dividends to investors ͑Watts 2003͒.
Neuroeconomic research suggests a strong pattern of brain behavior consistent with the principle of conservatism; specifically, the brain processes gains and losses differentially. Kahneman and Tversky ͑1979͒ hypothesized that people weight losses more than gains in making decisions. Neuronal data supporting this hypothesis surfaced in Breiter et al. ͑2001͒, who found differential response to gains and losses that implicated specific systems in the amygdala, an area associated with emotions such as fear. Knutson et al. ͑2001͒ studied the brain activation of subjects exposed to both losses and gains in their endowments while being scanned. Their fMRI study found that subjects are more sensitive to gains than losses in the brain area known as the mesial prefrontal cortex.
Recently, Tom et al. ͑2007͒ presented subjects with 256 50/50 gambles with gain and loss components and asked for attractiveness ratings on these gambles. The amount of gain and loss per gamble were the independent variables in a logistic regression with the attractiveness rating as the dependent variable. The ratio of the absolute coefficient of the gain to loss provides an estimate of the gain needed to compensate a unit of loss. Tom et al. ͑2007͒ find this ratio to be 1.97, a number consistent with behavioral loss aversion.
More importantly, when Tom et al. ͑2007͒ scanned individual subjects they found that specific brain areas such as the striatum, prefrontal cortex, and anterior cingulate show less absolute difference in activation for gains than for losses. The striatum is involved in processing expected rewards as well as their receipt ͑Schultz et al. 2000͒, and the anterior cingulate plays a role in conflict identification; for example, identifying departures from previously observed patterns ͑Be-chara and Damasio 2005͒. The prefrontal cortex is involved in executive functions within the brain requiring coordination of multiple processes; consistent with this, the prefrontal cortex is highly interconnected with other parts of the brain ͑Baird and Fugelsang 2004͒. Using the level of brain activation in these areas they can predict loss aversion for specific subjects. This suggests that the ultimate explanation for the Conservatism principle may derive from how gains and losses are differentially processed by neurons within the human brain.
Evidence on Other Cost-Benefit Evaluation Accounting Principles

Periodicity
The Periodicity principle leads to timing regularities in reporting where reports are provided at regular pre-specified time intervals. This allows accounting reports to function as a coordination device that brings managers, analysts, forecasters, investors, and others together to evaluate business performance.
Time regularity is a characteristic of the human brain that serves to coordinate daily life. Signals known as circadian rhythms occur approximately every 24 hours, and can set in motion the suppression of sleep hormones, a change in metabolism, and secretion of growth hormones. Thus, the brain has a time system that integrates and coordinates other signaling activities of the brain ͑Rusak and Zucker 1979͒. Coull and Nobre ͑1998͒ find that the intraparietal sulcus and inferior premotor cortex are implicated in attending to time intervals. It has also been demonstrated through single cell recording of Macaque monkeys that the lateral intraparietal sulcus identifies differences in duration of time and promotes the coordination of space and time information ͑Dehaene et al. 2003͒. Because the brain routinely demarcates different time intervals it is natural to see consilience between the brain and regular financial statement preparation.
Going Concern
The Going Concern principle assumes that a firm will operate in its current state for the foreseeable future. But where does the interest in going concern originate? One candidate is the predator-prey relationship; potential prey is interested in whether an observable predator is alive or dead. This interest springs from the intentionality of the predator. A live predator will want to eat, whereas a dead predator can be eaten. Humans and other animals strategize knowing that other animals are interested in their healthiness. Prey such as plovers will feign injury so as to distract predators from their nests. The desire to know whether a business is "alive" and will continue to operate thus may in part be a reflection of the brain's natural desire to want to know other actors' capabilities.
Concern about other parties' action states is referred to as intentionality, and sensitivity to intentionality is revealed in the human brain. In simple dynamic settings, humans attribute intentions even to inanimate objects. Castelli et al. ͑2000͒ found they could portray dynamical movement of geometric figures in such a way that subjects systemically interpreted these simple visual shapes as behaving as if they had intentions and beliefs. All of the brain areas that were activated for potential intentions were also activated for assessment of beliefs and additional areas were implicated for belief assessment. These results indicate a subject's differential assessment of the intentionality ͑expected actions͒ versus beliefs. While the going concern concept may have developed because of relatively recent business failures, it is important to ask why such a response may have arisen at all. We argue that the brain naturally searches out information on survival and expects to find out about failure when such knowledge is available.
Consistency
It is a long-established accounting principle that measurement rules should be consistently applied through time. We naturally see it as sensible to measure the height and width of objects using a constant scale over time. This allows us, for example, to detect growth through time by measuring a child's height on a consistent basis. When a business reports consistently ͑and has this verified by an audit͒, the business generates investors' trust by declining possible manipulative reporting actions. Using consistent accounting methods allows a manager to more accurately communicate trustworthiness in protecting shareholders' resources.
Looking for consistency in phenomena begins at an early age. Children near birth show a sense of expected consistency in the environment ͑Wynn 1996͒. The temporal difference model of Berns et al. ͑2001͒, discussed earlier in connection with Expense Matching & Cost Management, also accords with the Consistency principle. The human brain looks to identify phenomena that exhibit consistency, and we expect it is natural for the brain to expect such consistency in accounting measurement.
EVIDENCE ON QUANTIFICATION, RELIABILITY, AND THE BRAIN
We now review evidence on how accounting principles related to information reliability and quantification parallel decision making within the human brain. As with the prior section, we first discuss evidence suggesting a more direct link between the brain and accounting principles-in this case, Objectivity, Historical Cost, and Unit of Measure. We then discuss indirect evidence pertinent to Auditing & Internal Control and Materiality.
Objectivity
The principle of Objectivity has two components. One component is "hard" information that can reduce future disputes over what was originally promised and what actually happened in transactions. A second component is that the information describes an arms-length exchange. Thus, Objectivity is the principle that hard evidence of arms-length exchange is required before a transaction is entered in a firm's accounting records.
Hard verifiable evidence indicates that some forms of evidence are better than others. A signed receipt is generally construed to be hard evidence, while hearsay and various forms of estimation are considered soft evidence. A signed receipt is a start toward establishing hard evidence, but it sometimes is insufficient to establish that an exchange was at arm's length. Other evidence such as identifying any conflicting relationships between the parties to the transaction may be necessary. In addition, gathering evidence to infer the parties' intentions and relative power when they struck the initial exchange agreement may also be necessary. The brain is sensitive to the quality of information. Dickhaut et al. ͑2009͒ assume that a differential quality of information exists in ambiguous and risky stimuli. ͑Ambiguous information is of lower quality.͒ They show that the subject spends less time assessing comparisons with ambiguous stimuli and expends less effort in terms of mental activation of the intraparietal sulcus. Thus, the inherent tendency to assess information quality can be seen as a basis for distinguishing the quality of information that goes into accounting reports.
An arms-length exchange represents a consummated exchange between two willing and independent parties. Exchanges between family members are not viewed as being at arm's length, and the same applies to hypothetical transactions that are never consummated. Arm's length means that no deception is involved in the conduct of the exchange. A decision maker attempts to identify wealth-enhancing exchanges, and high-quality information is useful in evaluating a potential exchange party. Assessing whether advantageous exchange will occur thus involves an evaluation of the trading partner's intentions.
Exchange evaluation in this sense requires belief-reading behavior by exchange partners, a theory of mind ͑Baron-Cohen 1995͒. Human brains develop the ability to detect cheaters, which underlies theory of mind, at an early age. 14 Such assessments of others' beliefs have been associated with activations in the paracingulate cortex, an area located in the frontal lobe of the brain that has been implicated in the interpretation and monitoring of others' mental states ͑Gallagher and Frith 2003͒. McCabe et al. ͑2001͒ examine whether the brain is sensitive to the possibility of deception in a monetary transaction. They hypothesize that if a subject plays a game against another, the brain will invoke areas that detect possible deception by the other party, whereas no such effects will be observed when the subject plays against a computer.
McCabe et al. ͑2001͒ had their subjects engage in two types of games that allowed for the possibility of cooperative or deceptive behavior on the part of the subject. McCabe et al. ͑2001͒ then partitioned their subjects into cooperative and deceptive types based on these behaviors, and compared the brain activations for cooperative players when their partner was or was not cooperative. Subjects in the scanner knew whether their partner was a computer or a human. McCabe et al. ͑2001͒ show that the paracingulate cortex shows increased activation when the person in the scanner is playing with a human. No similar activation is present when the subject is playing with a computer. Thus, the paracingulate cortex of the brain activates when intentions can be ascribed to a partner.
Historical Cost
When a firm buys a truck or a building, its accountant initially records an asset for the amount sacrificed ͑i.e., historical cost͒ if it meets the criteria for an arms-length exchange. Historical cost provides businesses with a record of what they owe and what is owed them as well as a history of their dealings with others from whom they buy assets and services. Thus, recording at historical cost is an integral part of maintaining a reputation for participating in reciprocal exchange as well as keeping track of the reputation of those with whom businesses have dealt.
Knutson et al. ͑2007͒ provide some evidence of a link between historical cost and the human brain. They study consumer product choices using fMRI scanning and document an association between mesial prefrontal cortex activation and subjects' evaluation of price differential ͑i.e., the difference between purchase price and the subject's willingness to pay͒. Prior research had implicated the mesial prefrontal cortex in reward processing ͑e.g., Bjork et al. 2004͒ . Mesial prefrontal cortex activation during the receipt of price information also reliably predicted subsequent purchase decisions. This suggests that a direct representation of purchase price or historical cost exists within the brain when a choice made.
Unit of Measure
Financial statements are based on a variety of quantified aggregates that require both the preparer and reader to have quantitative abilities. For example, physical units and costs are used in generating measures of inventory, and multiplication, addition, and subtraction are employed in this calculation. Similar processes apply for different types of assets, which are then summed to generate total asset aggregates. The basic unit of account is the currency in the country where a business is located, which facilitates cross-sectional and intertemporal assessments of a business.
14 Wimmer and Permer ͑1983͒ show this with an experiment involving two children. Initially both children are allowed to observe a toy being placed in a basket. One child then leaves the room and the experimenter moves the toy to a nearby cupboard. At that point, the observer child is asked to predict what the absent child will say on returning about the toy's location. At very young ages, children predict the cupboard, but by age four, they begin to predict the basket, understanding that the absent child would be deceived. In this sense, the observer child is using a theory of mind to predict the absent child's future behavior.
The brain keeps tracks of magnitudes and can perform addition and subtraction on these amounts. The ordered line segment in the brain can represent dollar amounts. Some evidence on these properties was found by looking at the behavioral capabilities of lesioned subjects. This evidence suggests that these abilities are implicated in part in the intraparietal sulcus ͑Dehaene and Cohen 1997͒. This area is located within the parietal lobe and has been implicated in quantification tasks for both adults and four-year-old children ͑Cantlon et al. 2006͒ .
Whether one ordered-line segment or multiple-line segments exist within the brain is not fully understood, but the weight of the current evidence favors one mental-line segment. This is suggested since many task comparisons involving numerosity implicate similar areas of the brain ͑Dehaene et al. 2003͒. Other work suggests that judgment errors are induced when a subject is asked to make a judgment on one dimension while another dimension varies in the opposite direction ͑Pinel et al. 2004͒. For example, the letter a could be presented with a smaller font size, while the letter b is shown with a larger font size. If a is also presented with a bright color, while b is presented with a dull color, then subjects more often confound luminescence with font size. That is, when queried for which is larger, subjects often respond "a" because the bright color is more easily recalled even though the font size is actually smaller. In an accounting context, this raises the possibility, for example, that an internal representation of an inventory value may possibly interfere with the internal representation of a receivables amount.
The fact that the brain can have difficulty with multidimensional numerical stimuli suggests a level of complexity that could lead to external representations of the multidimensional characterization of businesses. In this sense, use of a common unit of measure allows comparison of units that are physically heterogeneous-for example, differences between receivables and inventory. The production of anything as complex as a balance sheet, which works with different types of assets and liabilities, would be a consequence of the Basu and Waymire ͑2006͒ hypothesis. Some form of auxiliary mechanism external to the brain such as the unit of measure principle would be needed to track and aggregate the effects of numerous transactions into a set of accounts.
Evidence on Other Accounting Principles Related to Quantification and Reliability
Auditing and Internal Control
When business managers agree to be audited, they commit to allowing a third party to observe them and determine whether they have followed established rules in reporting the results of their actions. In this sense, they are attempting to convey trustworthiness by allowing their actions in exchange transactions to be independently observed and reported. That is, a decision to submit to an audit conveys information on a person's intention to behave honestly. Audits have been conducted for thousands of years ͑Chatfield 1974, 3-31͒.
Experimentally, the act of being watched can exert powerful effects on behavior. For example, if a box for donations is placed beside a coffee machine, donations increase dramatically if a pair of glasses is also exhibited on a nondescript molded form placed next to the honesty box ͑Bateson et al. 2006͒. Similarly, the amount of cooperative behavior in economic games increases if eye spots are placed on the screen while an individual is playing ͑Haley and Fessler 2005͒. Thus, it can be conjectured that potential investors may increase their belief in managers' trustworthiness just because they know the managers know they are being watched. In addition to this underpinning for auditing, we know from Fehr and Gächter ͑2002͒, discussed earlier, that altruistic punishment likely plays an important part in sustaining social and economic interaction. The auditor can play such a role by providing a modified audit opinion.
Materiality
The occurrence of accounting errors in a business with millions of transactions is not surprising. Transactions sometimes are incorrectly recorded, omitted, and even falsified. The issue then is the degree of tolerance in terms of admissible errors given the prohibitive cost of detecting and correcting all errors. The Materiality principle is concerned with the degree of error rather than whether errors exist.
The Materiality principle is often implemented as a cutoff percentage based on the target economic magnitude under consideration. Thus, if income is $5,000, then a $500 departure might be material, whereas if income were $20,000, then $2,000 would be a material departure. As the target number becomes larger, equally close numbers are seen to be more similar under a percentage cutoff for determining materiality. Rose et al. ͑1970͒ provide experimental evidence suggesting that materiality used in an accounting context is consistent with the "just-noticeable" difference concept in psychology. A just-noticeable difference is the amount by which one physical magnitude ͑e.g., decibels of sound͒ must differ from another to be judged as two different magnitudes. The Weber-Fechner law from psychology suggests that as the absolute value of the target comparison increases, the just-noticeable difference also increases, which is broadly consistent with the percentage rule for materiality used in accounting.
The ordered line in the brain also has this characteristic. As the target magnitude increases it becomes more difficult for an individual to correctly judge numbers that are equidistant from a target. This has been demonstrated in an experiment with rats in which they are rewarded if they pressed lever A after having pressed B a fixed number of times ͑Mechner 1958͒. The higher the target number ͑i.e., the number press for the A lever͒, the more difficult it is for the subject to distinguish the target from the number of presses close to it. This is consistent with the rat having a mental number line for which there is increased noise as the target number increases ͑see Figure  7͒ . Alternatively, Longo and Lourenco ͑2007͒ provide experimental evidence from humans consistent with the mental number line being nonlinearly compressed, with pairs of fixed difference numbers lying closer together as their magnitude increases.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Our intent has been to take the first steps toward a coherent theory of accounting principles rooted in the neuroscience of the primate brain. We propose that culturally evolved accounting principles emerged and persisted because they are consilient with how the brain has evolved biologically to foster social exchange. The core of our hypothesis stems from the idea that the human brain is adapted for reciprocity in exchange. Norms favoring reciprocal exchange emerge from repeat interactions, and human institutions come to be shaped strongly by the biologically evolved brain ͑North 2005; Smith 2008͒. Our hypothesis is that accounting principles have been shaped in the same manner.
The main implication of our hypothesis is that basic accounting principles will parallel behavioral regularities documented by neuroscientists when humans and other primates make economic choices in controlled experiments. The evidence supports this conjecture. The brain processes information about uncertain rewards in a manner consistent with Revenue Realization, Conservatism, and Objectivity, and matches efforts with rewards consistent with Expense Matching & Cost Management. Furthermore, strong evidence links neuronal activation with the presentation of exchange price and quantity information as in Historical Cost and Unit of Measure principles, respectively.
We believe that further investment to identify the relation between culturally evolved accounting principles and the human brain offers enormous potential for improving our understanding of why accounting has taken its modern shape. In this sense, the present paper extends the analysis in Basu and Waymire ͑2006͒ to broadly consider how the central features of accounting beyond record keeping are influenced by the emergence and growing complexity of exchange. We recognize that many questions inherent in our paper remain to be addressed by future research.
Basu and Waymire ͑2006͒ hypothesize that new tools for managing exchange emerge when the human brain is presented with new exchange opportunities that cannot be assessed on a stand-alone basis. These tools include both enhancements to the memory of past exchange as well as tools for evaluating the desirability of exchange. Within this framework, accounting principles are part of the auxiliary set of tools used by the brain to successfully consummate exchange. These tools are partly the result of historical accident and depend on the technological opportunities that are available at a given point of time.
Experimental methods are emerging for assessing how principles of accounting measurement have originated and how they survive. For example, Basu, Dickhaut, Hecht, Towry, and Waymire ͑2009͒ demonstrate experimentally that when money was exchanged, subjects facing greater exchange complexity tended to keep records of the historical amounts exchanged in the transaction. The experiment used a trust game within two different settings. In the first basic setting, each investor was paired with only one trustee. In the second complex setting, each investor was paired with five different trustees, and vice versa. Basu, Dickhaut, Hecht, Towry, and Waymire ͑2009͒ found that subjects, when given the opportunity to keep records, were more likely to do so in the complex setting. These records indicated that they employed actual transaction amounts applicable to specific partners ͑i.e., historical cost͒. The possibility of recordkeeping also increased levels of coordination and decreased levels of risk in exchange. Simply stated, improvements were seen in the macro-performance of the economy when a primitive technology for accounting was available.
But the issues are broader. Historically, accounting and in particular the double-entry bookkeeping system have been claimed to play a critical role in economic development. For example, Sombart ͑1919͒, Weber ͑1927/1981͒, Mises ͑1949/1998͒, and Schumpeter ͑1950͒ hypothesize that double-entry bookkeeping influenced the Industrial Revolution by enabling capitalism ͑Carruthers and Espeland 1991; Most 1972͒. Recently, Clark ͑2007͒ argued that the increased numbers of the British upper class who valued prudence in investment played a critical role in the outcome of the Industrial Revolution. We would suggest that such prudence puts an added value on assessing the integrity of the individuals with whom trade is conducted, and so accounting records provide a basis for prudent actors to exercise discretion in judgments concerning investment and trade.
Similarly to Basu, Dickhaut, Hecht, Towry, and Waymire's ͑2009͒ laboratory experiment on recordkeeping, we propose an experiment to examine this accounting hypothesis. Subjects could first be screened to determine who is most trusting and trustworthy. Then, the more trustworthy could be examined in two different conditions: one with recordkeeping and one without. We expect that the injection of trustworthy individuals into an economy will improve overall productivity of the economy, and those persons would be more likely to use records. This experiment could also be extended to encompass neurological measurement to determine whether quantified accounting information engages different brain areas than qualitative descriptions of exchange results.
Another particularly important issue in accounting concerns the ability of agents to work with counterfactual information such as "fair" values in making economic decisions. A strong movement is afoot, based on balance sheet primacy, to report market values of asset and liability values on the balance sheet. As already noted, the brain evaluates gains and losses differentially-that is, harking back to the asymmetric timeliness inherent to Conservatism. The lower-of-cost-or-market rule in accounting dates to at least the early fifteenth century. Thus, the opportunity to use a mark-to-market approach has existed for centuries, and indeed was discussed in early accounting texts. Did the emergence of the lower-of-cost-or-market rule occur because of its greater consilience with brain function compared with a mark-to-market rule? We suggest that the study of human brain function under alternative accounting rules would give us some insight into this question.
Another issue that has vexed generations is the inherent conflict between different accounting principles. For example, the application of Conservatism involves a trade-off with Objectivity in that conditions giving rise to an asset write-down do not require the objective evidence of an arms-length transaction to generate a journal entry. Research on the brain identifies areas where conflict is identified and mediated through executive functions necessary for coordination ͑Glim-cher and Rustichini 2004͒, which suggests that neuroeconomics methods might be valuable for researching how accounting professionals' brains are able to resolve conflicts inherent in different accounting decisions.
These efforts might also refine our thinking as to the broader feedback effects of accounting. Scientists have hypothesized that formal use of bookkeeping can fundamentally alter the nature of human relationships-for example, human interaction and the language we use to communicate with one another may be altered by the presence of formal mechanisms for accountability ͑Silk 2004͒. More generally, humans, like other primates, are known to possess "mirror" neurons that fire when either we, or another person, perform the same task. Mirror neurons are hypothesized to allow us to imitate and learn from others, and also to infer intentionality, thereby promoting the ability to communicate through language ͑Iacoboni 2008͒. This may offer long-run potential for understanding how humans learn accounting and perhaps provide a scientific basis for the cliché that "accounting is the language of business."
We close by emphasizing two related points. First, this paper offers far more questions than answers, which will have to be resolved through future research over a decade or more. We of course cannot predict the specifics of where that path will lead. Second, pursuing this research agenda requires that we maintain focus on the long-term goal, which is to produce a theory of accounting rooted in the science of the human brain. Future work in neuroaccounting can have profound implications for both accounting policy making and research. This work may help us avoid placing undue reliance on deductive schemes for policy making that run contrary to the nature of the human animal. Our hope is also that future neuroaccounting research might help scholars avoid the over-generalization of statistical regularities derived from "pattern predictions" that are characteristic of what Friedrich Hayek refers to as mechanical "scientism" in his Nobel lecture ͑Hayek 1975͒.
